[git] gnupg-doc - branch, master, updated. fa61217e26a97c4b9f3294746a581aee5eb47ad8

by Neal H. Walfield cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Tue Nov 24 11:45:10 CET 2015


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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit fa61217e26a97c4b9f3294746a581aee5eb47ad8
Author: Neal H. Walfield <neal at gnu.org>
Date:   Tue Nov 24 11:44:33 2015 +0100

    web: Improve the text describing how to check a file's integrity.
    
    GnuPG-bug-id: 1648

diff --git a/web/download/integrity_check.org b/web/download/integrity_check.org
index 3825fbb..f9ef2d4 100644
--- a/web/download/integrity_check.org
+++ b/web/download/integrity_check.org
@@ -6,36 +6,87 @@
 * Integrity Check
 #+index: integrity check
 
-  In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
-  install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
-  the following ways.
+  You can check that the version of GnuPG that you want to install is
+  original and unmodified by either verifying the file's signature or
+  comparing the checksum with the one published in the release
+  announcement.
 
-** Using gpg
+** Verifying the File's Signature
 
   If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can
-  simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the
-  signature of the file gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2 you would use
-  this command:
+  check the supplied signature.  For example, to check the signature
+  of the file gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2, you can use this command:
 
   {{{begin_example}}}
-  gpg {{{twodashes}}}verify gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2
+  $ gpg {{{twodashes}}}verify gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2
   {{{end_example}}}
 
-  This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You
-  should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made
-  by of the [[../signature_key.org][signing keys]]. Make sure that you have the right key, either
-  by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by
-  checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key.
+  *Note: you should never use a GnuPG version you just downloaded to
+  check the integrity of the source* --- use an existing, trusted GnuPG
+  installation, e.g., the one provided by your distribution.
 
-  Never use a GnuPG version you just downloaded to check the integrity
-  of the source --- use an existing GnuPG installation.
+  If the output of the above command is similar to the following, then
+  either you don't have our distribution keys (our [[../signature_key.org][signing keys are
+  here]]) or the signature was generated by someone else and the file
+  should be treated suspiciously.
 
-** Using sha1sum
+  {{{begin_example}}}
+  gpg: Signature made Fri 09 Oct 2015 05:41:55 PM CEST using RSA key ID 4F25E3B6
+  gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
+  gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
+  gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
+  {{{end_example}}}
+
+  If you instead see:
+
+  {{{begin_example}}}
+  gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
+  gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
+  gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
+  Primary key fingerprint: D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
+  gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
+  gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe at fsij.org>" [unknown]
+  gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
+  gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
+  Primary key fingerprint: 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286  A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
+  {{{end_example}}}
 
-   If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to
-   verify the SHA1 checksum. Assuming you downloaded the file
-   gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2, you would run the =sha1sum=
-   command like this:
+  then you have a copy of our keys and the signatures are valid, but
+  either you have not marked the keys as trusted or the keys are a
+  forgery.  In this case, at the very least, you should compare the
+  fingerprints that are shown to those on the [[../signature_key.org][signing keys page]].  Even
+  better is to compare the fingerprints with those shown on our
+  business cards, which we handout at events that we attend.
+
+  Ideally, you'll see something like:
+
+  {{{begin_example}}}
+  gpg: Signature made Fri 09 Oct 2015 05:41:55 PM CEST using RSA key ID 4F25E3B6
+  gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [full]
+  gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
+  gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe at fsij.org>" [full]
+  {{{end_example}}}
+
+  This means that the signature is valid and that you trust this key
+  (either you signed it or someone you trusted did).
+
+** Comparing Checksums
+
+   If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you can still
+   verify the file's SHA1 checksum.  This is less secure, because if
+   someone modified the files as they were transferred to you, it
+   would not be much more effort to modify the checksums that you see
+   on this webpage.  As such, if you use this method, you should
+   compare the checksums with those in release announcement.  This is
+   sent to the gnupg-announce mailing list (among others), which is
+   widely mirrored.  Don't use the mailing list archive on this
+   website, but find the announcement on several other websites and
+   make sure the checksum is consistent.  This makes it more difficult
+   for an attacker to trick you into installing a modified version of
+   the software.
+
+   Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2, you
+   can run the =sha1sum= command like this:
 
    {{{begin_chksum}}}
    sha1sum gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2
@@ -48,10 +99,6 @@
    {{{gnupg_sha1}}}  gnupg-{{{gnupg_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{end_chksum}}}
 
-   To be sure that this page has not been tampered, you may want to
-   compare the list below with the one included in the announcement
-   mail posted to several mailing list.
-
 ** List of SHA-1 check-sums
 
    For your convenience, all SHA-1 check-sums available for software

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 web/download/integrity_check.org | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)


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