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commit 3b5ccd855bfbc6dd1c72c66967ce5f88f3e60597
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Mon Nov 20 10:04:25 2017 +0100
drafts,openpgp-webkey-service: Publish revision -05
diff --git a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05.txt b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05.txt
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+
+
+
+
+Network Working Group W. Koch
+Internet-Draft GnuPG Project
+Intended status: Informational November 20, 2017
+Expires: May 24, 2018
+
+
+ OpenPGP Web Key Directory
+ draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05
+
+Abstract
+
+ This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP keys by mail
+ address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol. It also provides
+ a method for secure communication between the key owner and the mail
+ provider to publish and revoke the public key.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
+ provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
+
+ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
+ Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
+ working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
+ Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
+
+ Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
+ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
+ time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
+ material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
+
+ This Internet-Draft will expire on May 24, 2018.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 1]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 3. Web Key Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 3.1. Key Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 4. Web Key Directory Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+ 4.1. The Submission Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 4.2. The Submission Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+ 4.3. The Confirmation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 4.4. The Confirmation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
+ 4.5. Policy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 6.1. Well-Known URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ Appendix A. Sample Protocol Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+ A.1. Sample Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ A.2. Sample Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+ Appendix B. Changes Since -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+ Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ This memo describes a method to associate OpenPGP keys with a mail
+ address and how to look them up using a web service with a well-known
+ URI. In addition a mail based protocol is given to allow a client to
+ setup such an association and to maintain it.
+
+2. Notational Conventions
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+3. Web Key Directory
+
+ A major use case for OpenPGP is the encryption of mail. A common
+ difficulty of sending encrypted mails to a new communication partner
+ is to find the appropriate public key of the recipient. Unless an
+ off-channel key exchange has been done, there are no easy ways to
+ discover the required key. The common practice is to search the
+ network of public key servers for a key matching the recipient's mail
+ address. This practise bears the problem that the keyservers are not
+ able to give a positive confirmation that a key actually belongs to
+ the mail addresses given in the key. Further, there are often
+ several keys matching a mail address and thus one needs to pick a key
+
+
+
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+
+
+ on good luck. This is clearly not a secure way to setup an end-to-
+ end encryption. Even if the need for a trusted key for an initial
+ mail message is relinquished, a non-authenticated key may be a wrong
+ one and the actual recipient would receive a mail which she can't
+ decrypt, due to the use of a wrong key.
+
+ Methods to overcome this problem are
+
+ o sending an initial unencrypted message with the public key
+ attached,
+
+ o using the OpenPGP DANE protocol to lookup the recipients key via
+ the DNS.
+
+ The first method has the obvious problems of not even trying to
+ encrypt the initial mail, an extra mail round-trip, and problems with
+ unattended key discovery.
+
+ The latter method works fine but requires that mail providers need to
+ set up a separate DNS resolver to provide the key. The
+ administration of a DNS zone is often not in the hands of small mail
+ installations. Thus an update of the DNS resource records needs to
+ be delegated to the ISP running the DNS service. Further, DNS
+ lookups are not encrypted and missing all confidentially. Even if
+ the participating MUAs are using STARTTLS to encrypt the mail
+ exchange, a DNS lookup for the key unnecessarily identifies the
+ local-part of the recipients mail address to any passive
+ eavesdroppers.
+
+ This memo specified a new method for key discovery using an encrypted
+ https connection.
+
+3.1. Key Discovery
+
+ Although URIs are able to encode all kind of characters,
+ straightforward implementations of a key directory may want to store
+ the local-part of a mail address directly in the file system. This
+ forbids the use of certain characters in the local-part. To allow
+ for such an implementation method the URI uses an encoded form of the
+ local-part which can be directly mapped to a file name.
+
+ OpenPGP defines its User IDs, and thus the mail address, as UTF-8
+ strings. To help with the common pattern of using capitalized names
+ (e.g. "Joe.Doe at example.org") for mail addresses, and under the
+ premise that almost all MTAs treat the local-part case-insensitive
+ and that the domain-part is required to be compared case-insensitive
+ anyway, all upper-case ASCII characters in a User ID are mapped to
+ lowercase. Non-ASCII characters are not changed.
+
+
+
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+
+
+ The so mapped local-part is hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm. The
+ resulting 160 bit digest is encoded using the Z-Base-32 method as
+ described in [RFC6189], section 5.1.6. The resulting string has a
+ fixed length of 32 octets. To form the URI, the following parts are
+ concatenated:
+
+ o The scheme "https://",
+
+ o the domain-part,
+
+ o the string "/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/",
+
+ o and the above constructed 32 octet string.
+
+ For example the URI to lookup the key for Joe.Doe at Example.ORG is:
+
+ https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/
+ hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q
+
+ (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)
+
+ DNS SRV resource records ([RFC2782]) may be used to query a different
+ host or a port other than 443. For example:
+
+ _openpgpkey._tcp.example.org. IN SRV 0 0 8443 wkd.example.org.
+
+ changes the above to query the host "wkd.example.org" at port 8443
+ instead of the host "example.org" at port 443. The target (in the
+ example "wkd.example.org") MUST be a sub-domain of the domain-part
+ (here "example.org"). If the target is not a sub-domain, the SRV RR
+ MUST be be ignored. The recommended name for the sub-domain is
+ "wkd".
+
+ The HTTP GET method MUST return the binary representation of the
+ OpenPGP key for the given mail address. The key needs to carry a
+ User ID packet ([RFC4880]) with that mail address. Note that the key
+ may be revoked or expired - it is up to the client to handle such
+ conditions. To ease distribution of revoked keys, a server may
+ return revoked keys in addition to a new key. The keys are returned
+ by a single request as concatenated key blocks.
+
+ The server MUST accept the HTTP HEAD method to allow a client to
+ check for the existence of a key.
+
+ The server SHOULD use "application/octet-string" as the Content-Type
+ for the data but clients SHOULD also accept any other Content-Type.
+ The server MUST NOT return an ASCII armored version of the key.
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ The server MUST serve a Policy Flags file as specified below. That
+ file is even required if the Web Key Directory Update Protocol is not
+ supported.
+
+4. Web Key Directory Update Protocol
+
+ To put keys into the key directory a protocol to automate the task is
+ desirable. The protocol defined here is entirely based on mail and
+ the assumption that a mail provider can securely deliver mail to the
+ INBOX of a user (e.g. an IMAP folder). Note that the same protocol
+ may also be used for submitting keys for use with OpenPGP DANE.
+
+ We assume that the user already created a key for her mail account
+ alice at example.org. To install the key at her provider's Web Key
+ Directory, she performs the following steps:
+
+ 1. She retrieves a file which contains one line with the mail
+ address used to submit the key to the mail provider. The DNS SRV
+ rules described for the Web Key Directory apply here as well.
+ See below for the syntax of that file. For a mail address at the
+ domain "example.org" the URI of the file is
+
+ https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/submission-address
+
+ 2. She sends her key using SMTP (or any other transport mechanism)
+ to the provider using the submission address and key format as
+ specified by PGP/MIME.
+
+ 3. The provider checks that the received key has a User ID which
+ matches an account name of the provider.
+
+ 4. The provider sends an encrypted message containing a nonce and
+ the fingerprint of the key to the mail account of the user. Note
+ that a similar scheme is used by the well known caff(1) tool to
+ help with key signing parties.
+
+ 5. A legitimate user will be able to decrypt the message because she
+ created the key and is in charge of the private key. This step
+ verifies that the submitted key has actually been created by the
+ owner of the account.
+
+ 6. The user sends the decrypted nonce back to the submission address
+ as a confirmation that the private key is owned by her and that
+ the provider may now publish the key. Although technically not
+ required, it is suggested that the mail to the provider is
+ encrypted. The public key for this is retrieved using the key
+ lookup protocol described above.
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ 7. The provider receives the nonce, matches it with its database of
+ pending confirmations and then publishes the key. Finally the
+ provider sends a mail back to the user to notify her of the
+ publication of her key.
+
+ The message data structures used for the above protocol are specified
+ in detail below. In the following sections the string "WELLKNOWN"
+ denotes the first part of an URI specific for a domain. In the
+ examples the domain "example.org" is assumed, thus
+
+ WELLKNOWN := https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey
+
+ The term "target key" denotes the to be published key, the term
+ "submission key" the key associated with the submission-address of
+ the mail provider.
+
+4.1. The Submission Address
+
+ The address of the submission file is
+
+ WELLKNOWN/submission-address
+
+ The file consists of exactly one line, terminated by a LF, or the
+ sequence of CR and LF, with the full mail address to be used for
+ submission of a key to the mail provider. For example the content of
+ the file may be
+
+ key-submission-example.org at directory.example.org
+
+4.2. The Submission Mail
+
+ The mail used to submit a key to the mail provider MUST comply to the
+ PGP/MIME specification ([RFC3156], section 7), which states that the
+ Content-Type must be "application/pgp-keys", there are no required or
+ optional parameters, and the body part contains the ASCII-armored
+ transferable Public Key Packets as defined in [RFC4880], section
+ 11.1.
+
+ The mail provider MUST publish a key capable of signing and
+ encryption for the submission-address in the Web Key Directory or via
+ DANE. The key to be published MUST be submitted using a PGP/MIME
+ encrypted message ([RFC3156], section 4). The message MUST NOT be
+ signed (because the authenticity of the signing key has not yet been
+ confirmed). After decryption of the message at the mail provider a
+ single "application/pgp-keys" part, as specified above, is expected.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+4.3. The Confirmation Request
+
+ The mail provider sends a confirmation mail in response to a received
+ key publication request. The message MUST be sent from the
+ submission-address of the mail provider to the mail address extracted
+ from the target key. The message needs to be a PGP/MIME signed
+ message using the submission key of the provider for the signature.
+ The signed message MUST have two parts:
+
+ The first part MUST have "text" as its Content-Type and can be used
+ to explain the purpose of the mail. For example it may point to this
+ RFC and explain on how to manually perform the protocol.
+
+ The second part MUST have "application/vnd.gnupg.wkd" if the protocol
+ version of the server is 5 or later; without a known protocol version
+ or a version less than 5, "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" MUST be used as
+ its Content-Type and carry an OpenPGP encrypted message in ASCII
+ Armor format. The message MUST be encrypted to the target key and
+ MUST NOT be signed. After decryption a text file in the Web Key data
+ format must be yielded.
+
+ That data format consists of name-value pairs with one name-value
+ pair per LF or CR+LF terminated line. Empty lines are allowed and
+ will be ignored by the receiver. A colon is used to terminate a
+ name.
+
+ In a confirmation request the following names MUST be send in the
+ specified order:
+
+ o "type": The value must be "confirmation-request".
+
+ o "sender": This is the mailbox the user is expected to sent the
+ confirmation response to. The value must match the mailbox part
+ of the "From:" address of this request. Exactly one address MUST
+ be given.
+
+ o "address": The value is the addr-spec part of the target key's
+ mail address. The value SHOULD match the addr-spec part of the
+ recipient's address. The value MUST be UTF-8 encoded as required
+ for an OpenPGP User ID.
+
+ o "fingerprint": The value is the fingerprint of the target key.
+ The fingerprint is given in uppercase hex encoding without any
+ interleaving spaces.
+
+ o "nonce": The value is a string with a minimum length of 16 octets
+ and a maximum length of 64 octets. The string must entirely be
+ made up of random ASCII letters or digits. This nonce will be
+
+
+
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+
+
+ sent back to the mail provider as proof that the recipient is the
+ legitimate owner of the target-key.
+
+ The receiver of that message is expected to verify the outer
+ signature and disregard the entire message if it can't be verified or
+ has not been signed by the key associated with the submission
+ address.
+
+ After the message as been verified the receiver decrypts the second
+ part of the message, checks that the "fingerprint" matches the target
+ key, checks that the "address" matches a User ID of the target key,
+ and checks the other constrains of the request format. If any
+ constraint is not asserted, or the fingerprint or User ID do not
+ match the target key, or there is no pending publication requests
+ (i.e. a mail recently sent o the submission address), the user MAY be
+ notified about this fake confirmation attempt.
+
+ In other cases the confirmation request is legitimate and the MUA
+ shall silently send a response as described in the next section.
+
+ The rationale for the outer signature used with this request is to
+ allow early detection of spam mails. This can be done prior to the
+ decryption step and avoids asking the user to enter a passphrase to
+ perform the decryption for a non-legitimate message. The use of a
+ simple encrypted attachment, instead of using PGP/MIME encryption, is
+ to convey the Content-Type of that attachment in the clear and also
+ to prevent automatic decryption of that attachment by PGP/MIME aware
+ clients. The MUA may in fact detect this confirmation request and
+ present a customized dialog for confirming that request.
+
+4.4. The Confirmation Response
+
+ A response to a confirmation request MUST only be send in the
+ positive case; there is no negative confirmation response. A mail
+ service provider is expected to cancel a pending key submission after
+ a suitable time without a confirmation. The mail service provider
+ SHOULD NOT retry the sending of a confirmation request after the
+ first request has been send successfully.
+
+ The user MUST send the confirmation response from her target mail
+ address to the "from" address of the confirmation request. The
+ message MUST be signed and encrypted using the PGP/MIME Combined
+ format ([RFC3156], section 6.2). The signing key is the target key
+ and the encryption key is the key associated with the provider's
+ submission address.
+
+ The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST match the
+ Content-Type of the request. The format is the same as described
+
+
+
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+
+
+ above for the Confirmation Request. The body must contain three
+ name-value pairs in this order:
+
+ o "type": The value must be "confirmation-response".
+
+ o "sender": The value must match the mailbox part of the "From:"
+ address of this response. Exactly one address MUST be given.
+
+ o "nonce": The value is the value of the "nonce" parameter from the
+ confirmation request.
+
+4.5. Policy Flags
+
+ For key generation and submission it is useful to tell the client
+ about certain properties of the mail provider in advance. This can
+ be done with a file at the URL
+
+ WELLKNOWN/policy
+
+ A site supporting the Web Key Directory MUST serve this file; it is
+ sufficient if that file has a zero length. Clients may use this file
+ to check for Web Key Directory support.
+
+ The file contains keywords and optioanlly values, one per line with
+ each line terminated by a LF or the sequence of CR and LF. Empty
+ lines and lines starting with a '#' character are considered comment
+ lines. A keyword is made up of lowercase letters, digits, hyphens,
+ or dots. An underscore is allowed as a name space delimiters; see
+ below. The first character must be a letter. Keywords which are
+ defined to require a value are directly followed by a colon and then
+ after optional white space the value. Clients MUST use case-
+ insensitive matching for the keyword.
+
+ Currently defined keywords are:
+
+ o "mailbox-only": The mail server provider does only accept keys
+ with only a mailbox in the User ID. In particular User IDs with a
+ real name in addition to the mailbox will be rejected as invalid.
+
+ o "dane-only": The mail server provider does not run a Web Key
+ Directory but only an OpenPGP DANE service. The Web Key Directory
+ Update protocol is used to update the keys for the DANE service.
+
+ o "auth-submit": The submission of the mail to the server is done
+ using an authenticated connection. Thus the submitted key will be
+ published immediately without any confirmation request.
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ o "protocol-version": This keyword can be used to explicitly claim
+ the support of a specific version of the Web Key Directory update
+ protocol. This is in general not needed but implementations may
+ have workarounds for providers which only support an old protocol
+ version. If these providers update to a newer version they should
+ add this keyword so that the implementation can disable the
+ workaround. The value is an integer corresponding to the
+ respective draft revision number.
+
+ More keywords will be defined in updates to this I-D. There is no
+ registry except for this document. For experimental use of new
+ features or for provider specific settings, keywords MUST be prefixed
+ with a domain name and an underscore.
+
+5. Security Considerations
+
+ The use of SHA-1 for the mapping of the local-part to a fixed string
+ is not a security feature but merely used to map the local-part to a
+ fixed-sized string made from a well defined set of characters. It is
+ not intended to conceal information about a mail address.
+
+ The domain name part of the mail address is not part of the hash to
+ avoid problems with internationalized domain names. Instead a
+ separate URL is required for each domain name.
+
+ The use of DNS SRV records reduces the certainty that a mail address
+ belongs to a domain. For example an attacker may change the target
+ to a host in a sub-domain under their control and thus gain full
+ control over all keys. An implementation may want to weight the
+ certainty of a mapping different if it has been retrieved via a sub-
+ domain and in particular if a non-recommended name is used for the
+ sub-domain.
+
+6. IANA Considerations
+
+6.1. Well-Known URI
+
+ IANA is requested to assign a well-known URI in the "Well-Known URIs"
+ registry as defined by [RFC5785]:
+
+ URI suffix: openpgpkey
+
+ Change controller: IETF
+
+ Specification document: This
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+7. Acknowledgments
+
+ The author would like to acknowledge the help of the individuals who
+ kindly voiced their opinions on the GnuPG mailing lists, in
+ particular, the help of Bernhard Reiter and Guilhem Moulin.
+
+8. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
+ specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000, <https://www.rfc-
+ editor.org/info/rfc2782>.
+
+ [RFC3156] Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
+ "MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156, August 2001.
+
+ [RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
+ Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.
+
+ [RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
+ Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, DOI
+ 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
+
+ [RFC6189] Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., Ed., and J. Callas, "ZRTP:
+ Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP", RFC
+ 6189, DOI 10.17487/RFC6189, April 2011,
+ <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6189>.
+
+Appendix A. Sample Protocol Run
+
+ The following non-normative example can be used by implementors as
+ guidance.
+
+ Note that GnuPG version 2.1.12 supports the key discovery described
+ in version -00 of this document (auto-key-locate method "wkd").
+ Version 2.1.16 can run the protocol described in this document but is
+ also able to run the protocol version specified by -01. For backward
+ compatibility this example uses the Content-Type as required for
+ versions of this protocol prior to -04; if the client knows that the
+ server support -04 "vnd.gnupg.wkd" should be used.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+A.1. Sample Keys
+
+ This is the provider's submission key:
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
+
+ lFgEV/TAohYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAB/k9YQfSTI8qQqqK1KimH/BsvzsowWItSQPT
+ FP+fOC4AAP46uJ3Snno3Vy+kORye3rf0VvWvuz82voEQLxG6WpfHhREEtBprZXkt
+ c3VibWlzc2lvbkBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJX9MCiAhsDBQsJCAcCBhUI
+ CQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEKhtNooW0cqEWMUA/0e9XaeptszWC9ZvPg8INL6a
+ BvRqPBYGU7PGmuXsxBovAQDyckOykG0UAfHVyN1w4gSK/biMcnqVr857i8/HuvjW
+ C5xdBFf0wKISCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0Apvaoe4MtSEJ1fpds/4DFl2kXXBpnVji/s
+ Wg9btdthNQMBCAcAAP9FJX99T1LEJzBnvBBnc6bimnT6/1OKM9RdO4R0/uVP6BFL
+ iGEEGBYIAAkFAlf0wKICGwwACgkQqG02ihbRyoTlGwD9FBr92osjL7HkhhZZ7Z2D
+ My3b9zpoZeMjvPg5YPqpdKMA/jhZoHuZCRMBYf7YRFb8aXtuyetDFZYrkjnum+OG
+ HFAD
+ =Hnwd
+ -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
+
+ This is the target key to be published:
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
+
+ lFgEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
+ nTEoBRkAAP94nCZMM4WY2IORXfM6phLGSz3RsHvs/vA1Opaus4+R3BKJtBtwYXRy
+ aWNlLmx1bXVtYmFAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXSIeQQTFggAIQUCV2o9XQIbAwULCQgHAgYV
+ CAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRATlWNoKgINCpkNAQDFDcwJUzsxu7aJUiPdpYXj
+ 4uVarrXakxEE8mGFotWhLAD9GH4rqLDYIE3NKEU0s+Okt4tEIwJaV8H1NNPPPMiK
+ 3g2cXQRXaj2NEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAFnnmZc99TuKk5iCq9wmYZUVF2RcXN2Cs
+ qAl8iGQQUWsDAQgHAAD/VN/VGmlcwGBPcLTya2hfU4t37nMcFCKdNSXjJ5DFA0AP
+ PohhBBgWCAAJBQJXaj2NAhsMAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0Ky4UA/0GmVaXzXemLvv1Xw4yx
+ Eaz/KfKKGc4RJ+38fyqUzw8NAQCohQ+ki3I5f84EXLZEiUiLsnVtOn1HNxvND/gW
+ TiFZBA==
+ =GHi7
+ -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
+
+A.2. Sample Messages
+
+ The first message triggeres the publication requests.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 12]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+ From: patrice.lumumba at example.net
+ To: key-submission at example.net
+ Subject: Key publishing request
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
+ boundary="=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-="
+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:15:51 +0000
+
+
+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
+
+ Version: 1
+
+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAR1AcqvFpQe/fHRZbf0xcnl9Tb+AtwaX2yZnZXGELGHsw
+ 1/e3E0JptwM5tpRAVe71ooF8Zq4jl76ZgQKfj/SyjpLJxyoEDy2N5wTQaqW4JtML
+ 0ukB1vh7dIRDxBJX/LQIJC0wz8o1Q3vjcLJKFFvDb7YrerABpPIzwOAupcgIbQHj
+ 5m1+2WU5CL8ffyJy2h1jV2X4OnvWF1Sn6J6SVD6DfZpOPRt9TxSemJrN1LJ3lG0N
+ ts8AuYmCOeC1H2r5TYyxqkC98JF8+Nvyxd/fwne8IOjK9uixkNMC5H9/ZOH0YWCb
+ wBnNB4iXuym4OIPxiLkDymsVF0ww/XrODE9Y259EGmO45VFNrJAX3HFs9/PcMCVk
+ n2qMyEkr8LHiXeEPun6Z54RHUPYv2cUkEZ0hhSJ+rtBxkc/5D/cAScCEXRKFSKEF
+ jLJAvLK/u/ga5DAzVai+vh6b6Bq+YVPaD9GWMhWj4CgR90p9LULi6S/Hzwhv9Wzf
+ 8fJoJOaDjyvRDgr09jYLWamxkS9NWxqwy6MXJvxwbNdd5XtqiW4Y4o0Ll1hDJhxR
+ ljn/XvotXKwhKN+4QGhIXDVt4Dl4XxS5ptWfVTau8W8DYqDsU2obEcfsirZv53M1
+ Q9FCD8CD9+dkBt8VAJekCWVhEltcRHxlrznbk2jxm93xSD2o6gZ5X0VSaSUXyEhm
+ J+8F3gyTHGgbq/TgyjFoockWh5EtGgAFuWvmPJCF5PO/UaNeoKwgwSJBu6oTXkHx
+ R4nvvMRcj5UgTsKpZ79NiDQukbjG5ScNT5TCUiiZsBXBqBx3fD61EH6cAuh4P3Kr
+ iM7PY4fwAHo890Dx+Qlt
+ =WIhx
+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=--
+
+ The server decrypts this message to
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 13]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+ Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+ mDMEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
+ nTEoBRm0G3BhdHJpY2UubHVtdW1iYUBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJXaj1d
+ AhsDBQsJCAcCBhUICQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KmQ0BAMUNzAlT
+ OzG7tolSI92lhePi5VqutdqTEQTyYYWi1aEsAP0YfiuosNggTc0oRTSz46S3i0Qj
+ AlpXwfU00888yIreDbg4BFdqPY0SCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0AWeeZlz31O4qTmIKr3
+ CZhlRUXZFxc3YKyoCXyIZBBRawMBCAeIYQQYFggACQUCV2o9jQIbDAAKCRATlWNo
+ KgINCsuFAP9BplWl813pi779V8OMsRGs/ynyihnOESft/H8qlM8PDQEAqIUPpIty
+ OX/OBFy2RIlIi7J1bTp9RzcbzQ/4Fk4hWQQ=
+ =qRfF
+ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+ and returns this confirmation request
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 14]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+ From: key-submission at example.net
+ To: patrice.lumumba at example.net
+ Subject: Confirm your key publication
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
+ boundary="=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-="
+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:16:57 +0000
+
+
+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
+
+ Version: 1
+
+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ hF4DkYWHjk/NdMASAQdAluQeqhECpU2T0zEyBAEbFzhLkpubN160wjkFCrtUc0Mw
+ FwYgM2fp9cvTMdJ/xjkvmAcIEOT4AY/hn1yFQ4z0KG0gCkSac+8mkDylnPdxlXYw
+ 0sBSAXlbqpVA7eUpFuU2Zs10zbIXxlwe6osR5wUIJut/RCOsYQmfvxC55x8mUX5/
+ zgTnNzlMzye5ws4pTgAeQm2x0Yv018L8IZgY5KxwJLBzlss0wLZ45ZcS80hR11Fx
+ NCow1fKF8lMnOJxagTEOih807nctz8vT5bR1gx0d7N3LM+th8nAg9/6Ghf1XTpLo
+ MzwGW0FtOG7Dg1Uxbw2bjaOuRBeh6IIpmNAw1pmIfnNu7PpoRydU5w1K/R8MT06z
+ MKdJ7IW5mVGes9EGnG3e4mjuILvNaZhfYy+a73IhDSaPm3oqdl1Qx7tbNg6lGjn6
+ KStCYAcPGPp3m7aWkfsPGThOVRhEXqaFFywfwSVEj1pdIRjDFA==
+ =Cdjh
+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=--
+
+ The client decrypts the attachment as
+
+ Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ type: confirmation-request
+ sender: key-submission at example.net
+ address: patrice.lumumba at example.net
+ fingerprint: B21DEAB4F875FB3DA42F1D1D139563682A020D0A
+ nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7
+
+ creates this response
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 15]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+ Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ type: confirmation-response
+ sender: key-submission at example.net
+ address: patrice.lumumba at example.net
+ nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7
+
+ and sends it encrypted to the server
+
+ From: patrice.lumumba at example.net
+ To: key-submission at example.net
+ Subject: Key publication confirmation
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
+ boundary="=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-="
+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:18:52 +0000
+
+
+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
+
+ Version: 1
+
+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+
+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAnB1C3PMjS4AsGU0qaCqBdWQO5i6blWEyZrEsY+JZY1Qw
+ ooNq7zdVWOHhL9LPGAALAgoL3Qfz+dN2u5QamSQ/LJ2c8M0XipNs3lqlNH63yQN1
+ 0sAmAc3W8xkwul+rf6OLK/gMi6WzM4fnUhd4D1LJGIJoNUN0l3636C7ecOt2lkMl
+ 5bVAYg/SyMT3ymyfQnvtiem2T5DSnPsS1g6n6QNXWvkqvX9yGxNsNDJEHTuGJB8k
+ OJoRlfWQTEo6pgA89febWl1EdeM1pPLstQ2uZE8NPjXoY1nMxAlu+iPYsR41/4sg
+ dqwOv5BPLh/GIat8hh9SPWCA9iKlgSQ/EIv5DpjQogEzpriT55dkgfvSVYIAcOdO
+ ShZ91YKkcZffevdY72omqTk10a1SUXehPooIlRFmroDsi3VDaRKrUIo=
+ =7uve
+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=--
+
+Appendix B. Changes Since -04
+
+ o Change to Content-Type "vnd.gnupg.wkd" for servers announcing its
+ support.
+
+ o Require the existance of the Policy Flags file.
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 16]
+
+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2017
+
+
+ o Re-title this I-D to Web Key Directory.
+
+Author's Address
+
+ Werner Koch
+ GnuPG Project
+
+ Email: wk at gnupg.org
+ URI: https://gnupg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Koch Expires May 24, 2018 [Page 17]
commit 5c1ee1ea462e00a337576a58442e79d839b371e5
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Mon Nov 20 10:03:57 2017 +0100
drafts: Add RFC-2782 reference
diff --git a/misc/id/common/reference.RFC.2782.xml b/misc/id/common/reference.RFC.2782.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2548b4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc/id/common/reference.RFC.2782.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+
+<reference anchor='RFC2782' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782'>
+<front>
+<title>A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)</title>
+<author initials='A.' surname='Gulbrandsen' fullname='A. Gulbrandsen'><organization /></author>
+<author initials='P.' surname='Vixie' fullname='P. Vixie'><organization /></author>
+<author initials='L.' surname='Esibov' fullname='L. Esibov'><organization /></author>
+<date year='2000' month='February' />
+<abstract><t>This document describes a DNS RR which specifies the location of the server(s) for a specific protocol and domain. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
+</front>
+<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2782'/>
+<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2782'/>
+</reference>
commit 1b509ef7898619351f9cc551340abc9395f9d27d
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Mon Nov 20 09:48:47 2017 +0100
drafts,openpgp-webkey-service: Require the Policy Flags
Also re-title the draft and and replace vnd.gnupg.wks by vnd.gnupg.wkd
to avoid confusion over the terms.
diff --git a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.org b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.org
index 6290b2e..b5a4f08 100644
--- a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.org
+++ b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.org
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
]>
<rfc ipr="trust200902" category="info"
- docName="draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-04">
+ docName="draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05">
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
<?rfc comments="yes"?>
<front>
- <title>OpenPGP Web Key Service</title>
+ <title>OpenPGP Web Key Directory</title>
<author initials="W." surname="Koch"
fullname="Werner Koch">
<organization>GnuPG Project</organization>
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
</address>
</author>
- <date month="July" year="2017" />
+ <date month="November" year="2017" />
<area>Security</area>
<abstract>
@@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ Content-Type for the data but clients SHOULD also accept any other
Content-Type. The server MUST NOT return an ASCII armored version of
the key.
+The server MUST serve a Policy Flags file as specified below. That
+file is even required if the Web Key Directory Update Protocol is not
+supported.
+
* Web Key Directory Update Protocol
@@ -307,7 +311,9 @@ The first part MUST have "text" as its Content-Type and can be used to
explain the purpose of the mail. For example it may point to this RFC
and explain on how to manually perform the protocol.
-The second part MUST have "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" as its
+The second part MUST have "application/vnd.gnupg.wkd" if the protocol
+version of the server is 5 or later; without a known protocol version
+or a version less than 5, "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" MUST be used as its
Content-Type and carry an OpenPGP encrypted message in ASCII Armor
format. The message MUST be encrypted to the target key and MUST NOT
be signed. After decryption a text file in the Web Key data format
@@ -386,10 +392,10 @@ format ({{{RFC(3156)}}}, section 6.2). The signing key is the target
key and the encryption key is the key associated with the provider's
submission address.
-The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST also be
-"application/vnd.gnupg.wks". The format is the same as described above
-for the Confirmation Request. The body must contain three name-value
-pairs in this order:
+The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST match the
+Content-Type of the request. The format is the same as described
+above for the Confirmation Request. The body must contain three
+name-value pairs in this order:
- type :: The value must be "confirmation-response".
@@ -402,7 +408,7 @@ pairs in this order:
** Policy Flags
-For key generation and submission it is sometimes useful to tell the
+For key generation and submission it is useful to tell the
client about certain properties of the mail provider in advance. This
can be done with a file at the URL
@@ -410,6 +416,10 @@ can be done with a file at the URL
WELLKNOWN/policy
#+END_EXAMPLE
+A site supporting the Web Key Directory MUST serve this file; it is
+sufficient if that file has a zero length. Clients may use this file
+to check for Web Key Directory support.
+
The file contains keywords and optioanlly values, one per line with
each line terminated by a LF or the sequence of CR and LF. Empty lines
and lines starting with a '#' character are considered comment
@@ -438,7 +448,7 @@ Currently defined keywords are:
any confirmation request.
- protocol-version :: This keyword can be used to explicitly claim the
- support of a specific version of the Web Key Service protocol.
+ support of a specific version of the Web Key Directory update protocol.
This is in general not needed but implementations may have
workarounds for providers which only support an old protocol
version. If these providers update to a newer version they
@@ -501,8 +511,11 @@ guidance.
Note that GnuPG version 2.1.12 supports the key discovery described in
version -00 of this document (auto-key-locate method "wkd"). Version
-2.1.16 can run the protocol decribed in this document but is also able
-to run the protocol version specified by -01.
+2.1.16 can run the protocol described in this document but is also able
+to run the protocol version specified by -01. For backward
+compatibility this example uses the Content-Type as required for
+versions of this protocol prior to -04; if the client knows that the
+server support -04 "vnd.gnupg.wkd" should be used.
** Sample Keys
@@ -699,7 +712,9 @@ ShZ91YKkcZffevdY72omqTk10a1SUXehPooIlRFmroDsi3VDaRKrUIo=
#+end_example
-* Changes Since -03
+* Changes Since -04
-- Fixed Content-Type in the description. The one used in the example
- was correct.
+- Change to Content-Type "vnd.gnupg.wkd" for servers announcing its
+ support.
+- Require the existance of the Policy Flags file.
+- Re-title this I-D to Web Key Directory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
misc/id/common/reference.RFC.2782.xml | 14 ++
...xt => draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05.txt} | 266 ++++++++++-----------
misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.org | 45 ++--
3 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 148 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 misc/id/common/reference.RFC.2782.xml
copy misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/{draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-04.txt => draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-05.txt} (85%)
hooks/post-receive
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