A coming attack on PGP, and a way to mitigate it

[Daniel Franke]

I <df at dfranke.us> wrote:
> It's a pity, really.  We're foiled by what's almost certainly nothing
> more than a thoughtless accident in the design of the protocol.  Perhaps
> this remains something to consider for the next protocol revision.  I
> can't think of any fundamental reason that PGP must necessarily be
> exploitable by birthday attacks of any sort, although I'm talking
> somewhat out of my depth in making this assertion.

Whoa, heh.  I just glanced at the authorship of RFC4880 and realized
whom I'm addressing :-).

-- 
 Daniel Franke         df at dfranke.us         http://www.dfranke.us
 |----| =|\     \\\\    
 || * | -|-\---------   Man is free at the instant he wants to be. 
 -----| =|  \   ///     --Voltaire
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