Fingerprint mismatch for 384-bit ECDH keys generated on SmartCards
wk at gnupg.org
Wed Mar 13 12:35:37 CET 2019
On Wed, 13 Mar 2019 09:27, gniibe at fsij.org said:
> use of CIPHER_ALGO_AES256 was not 100% wrong, and is considered OK (if
> it matches the behavior on smartcard).
It is actually done on purpose to limit the set of required algorithms.
AES-192 has no real purpose and thus it should be avoided.
I would prefer to change this in app-openpgp.c instead. In any case we
should use a shared code for the OpenPGP fingerprint computation. I am
currently working on v5 keys and this will require more changes anyway.
Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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