S/MIME or PGP/MIME?
Fri Dec 7 08:11:01 2001
Another point to note, of course, is that there is no way to prevent
people from using 40 bit encryption when sending S/MIME messages to you,
due to a number of technical mistakes in the S/MIME standard.
If people are interested, I'll dig up my list of reasons why S/MIME is
On Fri, 7 Dec 2001, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 06, 2001 at 05:14:34PM -0800, Paul Holman wrote:
> > I think there are a couple really important things to learn from the
> > S/MIME mailer implementations we've seen:
> IMHO, these are convenience-over-security choices.
> > 1 Key Propogation
> > S/MIME mailers attach the cert to every outgoing message and notice
> > when a cert is attached to incoming messages and add it to the
> > keyring (mixing metaphors a bit).
> Bandwidth waste... And this is polluting the keyring with potentially
> invalid (faked) keys. Adding a key to the keyring in the user's back
> certainly isn't good an idea.
> > 2 Opportunistic Encryption
> > Try sending a message to half a dozen recipients when you only have
> > keys for half of them. S/MIME mailers will encrypt tho those it
> > can, and send cleartext to the rest.
> Hu? That's clearly a security risk. If you want the message encrypted
> and it silently sends it as cleartext... You mean they really do that?
> Oh my god...
> > 3 Seamless Integration (My favorite!)
> > S/MIME mailers never show you any cyphertext. They just have little
> > icons to indicate when a message was encrypted or verified
> > successfully.
> Mutt does that >:-)
> > However, the problem isn't that the mailer developers are doing it
> > wrong, it is that they haven't been given the tool they need - an open
> > source OpenPGP toolkit.
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