using a revocation certificate

Huels, Ralf KSV
Fri Feb 9 11:10:02 2001

> Even that probably would never work. Bruce Schneier was saying
> that someone had uploaded a fake "Bruce Schneier" key to the keyserver
> years ago (this was about 2 years ago that he was telling me about this)
> and he tried for ages to get it removed. As fast as it would be removed,
> the other keyservers would resynchronized and add the key back. Unlike
> pokeymon, he couldn't catch'm all. Since he didn't have the private key,
> he couldn't revoke it either. :-(
Well. Fake keys (i.e. keys with someone´s name in it that don't belong to that person) should not really be a problem. Isn't that precisely what the Web of Trust is for? If someone's going to use a key only because it has the name of a recipient in its ID, they're missing the whole point of the Web of Trust. Even if it´s signed by other notables, all the keys could be fake... I was going to reply to this making a point about unwanted additions to keys I thought I had previously made in, but a strong sense of dèja vu led me to find out that I actually made it here: Has there been any progress in the developments subsequently discussed by Werner and L. Sassaman (i.e. the use of an "owner-update-flag")? Would it be feasible to create a protocol to allow deletions from unrevoked keys if they arrive at a keyserver in some kind of packet signed with that key? Tschüß, Ralf -- Ralf Hüls Bismarckplatz KSV Kreditschutz-Vereinigung GmbH 44866 Bochum Score-Consult Tel. 02327/9114-28 Fax. 02327/8 40 27