Corporate public key?
Tue Jul 8 22:04:02 2003
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Neil Williams wrote:
| On Tuesday 08 Jul 2003 6:13 pm, email@example.com wrote:
|>On Tue, 8 Jul 2003, Daniel Carrera wrote:
|>An ING corporate key has added power when the WoT is taken into
|>consideration. If ING's signing policy states that an ING signature on a
|>key means that the individual is an authorized agent of ING, you can be
|>sure that when you receive a communication from anyone who's key bears
|>ING's signature, that person is authorized to act on behalf of ING.
| I've imported public keys with some 700 signatures, but for WoT to
work at the
| customer end, wouldn't every customer (including potential customers
| be turned down for loans, credit etc.) have to sign the corporate ING
| That could be a few thousand. A key in my public ring only activates
| if there is a path from my key to the target key (of a short-ish
| path cannot begin until I've signed the ING key or a key that has also
| the ING key. Is it practical to put in the policy that customers only
| the ING key as non-exportable? Or must ING maintain the key and delete
| customer exportable signatures?
You shouldnt have to sign the key, it serves no purpose. Just mark it
as trusted and you wont get the warnings. but after all they are just
The key holder should have no problem scraping off junk signatures. I
hope this is how the WoT works. They really dont hurt anything, but
that would be a nasty performance hole/exploit to harm the overall
system and create confusion. easily one could make a key excessively
large and unwieldly.
|>Perhaps their UID would contain their corporate title:
|>uid John Smith (Vice President of Security) <firstname.lastname@example.org>
|>sig ING Corporation <email@example.com>
|>So now, when John Smith tells you he works for ING and that your loan was
|>approved, you know it's true.
| The UID details are not exactly hard to forge, the security should
| left to the fingerprint and signatures. If the email is signed (or
| signed and encrypted). then the contents of the email, including the
| and contact details of the person at ING, can be verified with the
| - bad signature and the customer must ask for confirmation from a central
| support address at ING.
|>This use of the WoT along with a corporate signature means that very few
|>people (perhaps just a guy in IT and a guy in HR) need access to
|>ING's main private key in order to sign new employee's keys and revoke
|>signatures on former employees when they leave the company.
|>I'm a CS undergrad and an expert in nothing, but to me this seems like a
|>good and workable idea.
| Just how practical ING will see it, we can only wait.
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