gpgsm --import of CA certificate: Bad signature?
Werner Koch
wk at gnupg.org
Wed Apr 18 12:33:31 CEST 2007
On Wed, 18 Apr 2007 11:39, simon at josefsson.org said:
> RFC 3279 is updated by RFC 4055 which says in section 2.1 (in
> particular the second paragraph):
Which is actually Peter's text but with a different suggestion.
> Although it may be argued that RFC 4055 only applies to RSA-PSS,
> although this particular section is not clear that it only applies to
> RSA-PSS.
The problem is that allowing for different encodings will require a
complete DER (or well for some old specs even BER) parser in libgcrypt.
Not long ago most crypto libraries showed implementaion flaws in that -
libgcrypt didn't suffer from this due its poor man's and simple approach
to checkthe RSA signature. Given that the code in gpgsm/libgcrypt has
passed several compatibility tests I doubnt that it is a good idea to
change it now and open the way to introduce new bugs.
> I should probably change GnuTLS here.
I'd appreciate that. If it later turns out that too many gnutls created
certificates are in use we might consider to add a hack to gpgsm just
for the SHA-1 case.
Shalom-Salam,
Werner
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