Hibernation and secret keys

Christoph Anton Mitterer christoph.anton.mitterer at physik.uni-muenchen.de
Mon Feb 16 12:47:11 CET 2009

On Mon, 2009-02-16 at 09:19 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> They will use a hardware logger and don't care about any encrypted
> stuff
> in your pocket.
Of course this is possible,.. but perhaps only for someone more
powerful. (NSA could perhaps even replace your CPU with one that has an
additional OS in it with wimax or s ;).

But anyway, I think it tightens security a bit more,... as "normal"
attackers, like Mr. Mehdorn probably have only access to normal

> Anyway, for your example: Who will execute the code to decrypt boot?
> What about another boot manager or a rogue BIOS or a complete
> virtualized machine?  Please repeat with me:
The boot manager would also be on the USB stick.
But of course you're right one cannot prevent attacks,...
Anyway,.. I think it still improves security, for "normal" attacks.

I mean we're trusting this security by obscurity in so many areas? e.g.
OpenPGPs private key encryption. Who prevents the friendly NSA worker
from torturing you to death in order to get you passphrase?
It's always a matter of how much "effort" an attacker puts into his

Best wishes,
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