multiple subkeys and key transition

[Robert J. Hansen]

On 12/9/2010 1:14 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>  I am giving very serious thought to creating new keys and
> doing a (long-term) transition to them.  This is partly to respond to
> known flaws with SHA-1 and take advantage of SHA-256 and higher.

My best counsel is: don't, at least not yet.

First, there are no imminent practical attacks on SHA-1.  Second, the
OpenPGP Working Group ("the WG") is currently figuring out how to get
SHA-1 out of the OpenPGP spec and how to replace it with something better.

If you do a transition now, it's possible you'll want to transition
again in six months or a year once the WG updates the RFC.

I'd hold off on this, at least for now.

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