multiple subkeys and key transition

[Ben McGinnes]

On 10/12/10 1:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 12/9/2010 1:14 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>>  I am giving very serious thought to creating new keys and
>> doing a (long-term) transition to them.  This is partly to respond to
>> known flaws with SHA-1 and take advantage of SHA-256 and higher.
> 
> My best counsel is: don't, at least not yet.

Okay.

> First, there are no imminent practical attacks on SHA-1.  Second,
> the OpenPGP Working Group ("the WG") is currently figuring out how
> to get SHA-1 out of the OpenPGP spec and how to replace it with
> something better.

Userful to know, can I track the WG's progress through this list or is
that done through the IETF or the OpenPGP site?

> If you do a transition now, it's possible you'll want to transition
> again in six months or a year once the WG updates the RFC.

Urgh, what a hideous thought.

> I'd hold off on this, at least for now.

Well, my current key has been perfectly fine since it's creation
nearly a dozen years ago.  I'm still sufficiently sure that there is
no imminent threat, so I'm happy to just watch and wait and see what
the WG says.


Regards,
Ben

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