plausibly deniable

[Robert J. Hansen]

On 7/22/2010 6:19 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>     This feature is also dubious, because there will be suspiciously
>     high-entropy on the disk, and you are known to be using tools with this
>     feature, you will simply be coerced until you've accounted for all
>     the data.

It's considerably worse than that.

Thanks to the deniable encryption features of TrueCrypt, there is no way
to account for all the data.  Is that empty space in your container, or
is there a small hidden container that you're not confessing?
Ultimately, you can't make the interrogation stop *even if you confess
all the information the interrogator wants* -- because the interrogator
might (reasonably!) think you're holding out.

Deniable encryption is a useful tool, but it is not a universally good idea.

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