plausibly deniable

[Ted Smith]

On Thu, 2010-07-22 at 21:53 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 7/22/2010 6:19 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> >     This feature is also dubious, because there will be suspiciously
> >     high-entropy on the disk, and you are known to be using tools with this
> >     feature, you will simply be coerced until you've accounted for all
> >     the data.
> 
> It's considerably worse than that.
> 
> Thanks to the deniable encryption features of TrueCrypt, there is no way
> to account for all the data.  Is that empty space in your container, or
> is there a small hidden container that you're not confessing?
> Ultimately, you can't make the interrogation stop *even if you confess
> all the information the interrogator wants* -- because the interrogator
> might (reasonably!) think you're holding out.
> 
> Deniable encryption is a useful tool, but it is not a universally good idea.
> 

An interrogator as described in this thread is a movie plot threat. In
reality, nobody is going to torture you for your key, because there are
much easier ways of obtaining your cleartext or figuring out if you have
a hidden volume.
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