auto refresh-keys

Hauke Laging mailinglisten at
Sun Jun 20 02:14:59 CEST 2010

Am Samstag 19 Juni 2010 13:36:15 schrieb MFPA:

> > Sending to several keyservers does not help if the MitM
> > attack point is on your side.
> Even if you send the key over an encrypted connection to a server? For
> example

No. Thus I wrote: "If your keyservers don't support TLS (I have no idea 
whether the important ones use it) then you are open to a MitM attack".

So in order to be safe you need additional CPU load either for TLS or for 
signing. Signing is superior IMHO because it allows reuse of the data (one 
crypto action (covering less data) for several users vs. one for each user 
with TLS) and makes more sense because you don't need a second crypto system 
(X.509) to protect the first (OpenPGP).

PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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