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Jerome Baum jerome at
Sat Dec 17 14:40:41 CET 2011

On 2011-12-17 14:29, gnupg at wrote:
> The system can be easily abused, therefore it will be abused. It's just
> a matter of time. How much time, depends on if/when PGP becomes more
> popular. It doesn't strike me as unreasonable to want to put defences in
> place before an attack begins.

Just like you shouldn't write blatantly inefficient code. But there's
also a point after which we call this premature optimization. Ditto for
putting up security measures for a problem that may well never become one.

I would be very happy to see this become a problem in fact. It would
imply that OpenPGP is popular enough to attract script kiddies & co.

PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
No situation is so dire that panic cannot make it worse.

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