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[Hubert Kario]

On Tuesday 20 of December 2011 17:34:24 Johan Wevers wrote:
> On 20-12-2011 16:49, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > Yeah, the kind of "protections" banks use is funny. But then, what can
> > they do when people forget their passwords 5 minutes after they set them
> > or use the same password on facebook and their bank...
>
> They could use the same system that all banks (minus one, ING, that as a
> result is the most attacked one here) in The Netherlands use: 2-factor
> authorization. When I want to login I have to put my debet card into a
> reader that can access the chip on it. It asks me for a pin code, then I
> have to enter a code given by the bank on the login screen, press OK and
> enter the response into the browser. The code I get from the bank is
> randomly generated by them, and the response depends on the debet card
> inserted in the device. Some banks work with code generators that don't
> require the use of your debet card. But a simple login/password combo,
> no bank would use that here.

I didn't mean the login to a web service. This is, in all cases I saw, always 
two-factor. I meant the phone service or all the credit card transactions.

-- 
Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85
tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
www.qbs.com.pl
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