Problem with faked-system-time option
hugo.seifert at hushmail.com
Tue Jun 28 20:13:48 CEST 2011
On Sun, 26 Jun 2011 13:40:10 +0000 Jerome Baum
<jerome at jeromebaum.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 14:16, Hugo Seifert
> <hugo.seifert at hushmail.com> wrote:
> > Or is the agenda behind GnuPG to provide privacy but forget
> or even prevent anonymity (...)
> Since when was it called "GNU Anonymity Guard"? Last time I
> it was called "GNU Privacy Guard".
What's in a name? GnuPG already cares about anonymity interests:
On Fri, Aug 21 1998 18:14:44 CEST, Nimrod Zimerman
<zimerman at forfree.at> wrote:
: A GNUPG patch to enable anonymous encrypted messages
: Below is a patch to GNUPG that allows removing the keyid from
: packets (such that one can't know who an encrypted packet is
: to), and, obviously, allows decrypting such packets (supplying the
: appropriate userid on the command line).
: Why is this needed? Privacy. When sending an encrypted message
via a named
: channel (such as 'regular' e-mail), revealing the destination of
: message is something you can't really avoid, and hence the keyid
: encrypted message doesn't matter. However, when sending a message
: anonymous channel (through a remailer to a newsgroup, for
: the keyid on the encrypted message is fairly counter productive.
: not provide potential adversaries the ability to know who can
: message - but it certainly helps, even if only by aiding in
: The solution is quite simple - avoid adding the keyid to
: (packets in those messages). This is exactly what the patch does,
: the command-line switch '--throw-keyid'.
Won't you agree, that a method to alter signature timestamps is a
perfect complement to the --throw-keyid option introduced back then?
Therewith a correct signature timestamp can no longer counteract the
random latency remailers add to the mail delivery time.
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