on running C-Z/SUV without a "group manager"

Faramir faramir.cl at gmail.com
Tue Aug 28 08:13:43 CEST 2012

Hash: SHA256

El 24-08-2012 8:42, peter.segment at wronghead.com escribió:
>> Yes and no. If the group manager configures the software,...
> This group's view is now that a single point of failure (such as a 
> "group manager" - who probably either does (or easily can, if she 
> so desires) know (or guess) the identity of ~all~ of the group
> members is to be avoided if at all possible. I'm suggesting (to
> them and to you) that it is indeed possible to construct both a
> piece of software - which is what we are discussing here - and the
> security protocols that would enable 100% peer-to-peer MO.

  Uh... well, that brings in another problem: how does Allice get
Bob's key or symmetrical password to encrypt the messages?

  Currently I don't even imagine what are the expected use cases
software must allow.

>> Since she is already going to use security software on unsecured 
>> computers, I don't know how much confidence she should have on
>> it,

> Please allow me to make this important point (again!): *these are
> not "unsecured computers"*. These are, without a trace of doubt,
> more secure computers than a typical Internet-connected MS Windows
> computer, and (oddly!) I don't ever remember on gpg user list any
> warning about using gpg on those. These are simply computers on
> which, for various reasons, no permanently installed software
> exists.

  Maybe I misunderstood the description of those on the road
computers. It may have been my fault, but I got the idea they would be
computers like you can find on coffees, or maybe libraries. If the
don't have permanently installed software (not even operating system),
then it is very likely they won't have malware on them. Unless Mallory
suspect Allice might use one of these computers, it is unlikely she
would install malware on the bios, or to use hardware devices to
tamper the computer.

>> ...Nobody can prove there is a hidden partition, but you can't
>> prove you don't have one, so beware of bamboo needles.
> Just for the record: nobody in this group is in any danger of
> being tortured (or worse). Nobody is likely to be even mistreated
> for the mere possession of some USB stick with unreadable content -
> as long as

  Then, Truecrypt, if Allice can get admin rights on the computers she
use. But only IF she is sure to don't be mistreated for the possession
of an unreadable USB stick.

> other hand, when her connection to the C-Z/SUV is established (or
> possibly just suspected) by her employer, Alice will very likely 
> end up unloading grocery trucks at her local supermarket for the
> next

  Then Allice must evaluate if the possession of an encrypted USB
stick can make her employer to suspect she is involved with something
he doesn't approve.


- - Encryption: Eve knows you have something there, but can't read it.

- - Steganography: Eve doesn't know you have something there, but she
might be able to find it if she looks very carefully. And if she finds
it, she can read it (unless you combine steganography with encryption.
But then you lose the benefits of steganography and you not only have
encrypted messages, you are also trying to hide the fact you have
encrypted messages...).

  Best Regards
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://www.enigmail.net/


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