VIA padlock (was: Re: GPG with GPUs)

[Peter Lebbing]

On 18/06/12 20:39, Werner Koch wrote:
> FWIW, Libgcrypt uses this RNG directly in addition to other sources.

Actually... I just checked git.gnupg.org, and I see these lines in Libgcrypt,
file random/rndhw.c:

# if defined (__i386__) && SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG == 4 && defined (__GNUC__)
# define USE_PADLOCK
# endif

I'm running x86_64: the VIA Nano is a 64-bits processor. So I think Libgcrypt
doesn't recognise it can use the padlock from the VIA Nano.

It's the same with OpenSSL in Debian. I don't particularly care about support
for the HWRNG (since it's already seeding /dev/random through rngd), but I do
definitely like hardware AES on this modestly powered beast. It runs a TOR node;
I think that is the main user of the hardware AES.

So I patch Debian's OpenSSL with a patch I based on a code repository from
upstream OpenSSL, so I can use the padlock AES under x86_64. I'd submit the
patch to Debian if I could still remember from where it came...

Peter.

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