Symmetric encryption - options?
Ingo Klöcker
kloecker at kde.org
Tue Mar 13 20:51:33 CET 2012
On Tuesday 13 March 2012, jpemail2001-321 at yahoo.com wrote:
> >It isn't RSA because this is symmetric encryption. CAST5 is a
> >128-bit block cypher.
>
> So its not really safe, is it?
Why do you think so? Define "really safe".
> @Robert
>
> >If you choose to use someone's public certificate to encrypt a
> >message, they use the private part of that certificate to decrypt
> >it -- different things for encryption and decryption, thus a
> >different kind of algorithm, an asymmetric one, is used.So you
> >would suggest, to use RSA? I think so because it seems to be
> >stronger encryption.
>
> The problem is I need to encrypt a message but I dont know the
> recipient yet. So I considered a passphrase method. Cause he dont
> need to send me his public key (if he has any).
>
> But.... OK I will try to encrypt the message with a new created
> private key (specially created for the recipient) which I will send
> later to him, so he will be able to decrypt the message. A bit
> complicated but possible, I think!? ^^
That doesn't make any sense. If you use symmetric encryption then you
have to tell the recipient the passphrase you used for encryption via a
safe channel.
If you use a private key then you have to tell the recipient the private
key and the passphrase you used to protect the private key again via a
safe channel. Of course, you could choose to leave the private key
unprotected.
In both cases you have to share a secret with the recipient via a safe
channel. So, where do you see the advantage of using a private key? A
possible reason would be re-use of the private key. But then you could
as well re-use the passphrase.
Regards,
Ingo
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