key generation: paranoia mode - explicit random input

[Hauke Laging]

Am Mi 26.02.2014, 22:29:46 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> Ultrasound, in combination with a nearby compromised online system
> with a microphone, for example.

Trivial to prevent in comparison to the task of verifying a distro.


> It sounds to me like the age-old "my system is compromised, but I
> still want to use GnuPG on it". I think you've heard the answer to
> that.

This attitute doesn't help though considering that we meanwhile face a 
situation in which it has become more or less impossible to build a 
system which is known non-compromised.

Your point is valid towards people who are just too lazy (or uninformed) 
to do what can be reasonably done. In that case a wish towards GnuPG 
could be simply replaced by improving the environment in which it is 
going to be used. My perspective is that what can be reasonably done at 
the system level may not be enough any more (at the upper border of 
requirements).

Furthermore while you cannot fix security problems in the outer system 
by the inner system (which I assume is the main part of the answer you 
mentioned) please mind that this is not what I suggest. I want to enable 
users to create another layer of control outside their system.

Thus I consider an improvement which is both easy to implement and easy 
to apply by the users a clear advantage. It is not enough to make 
ciphers and digests "NSA-proof" if that's not the attack vector they are 
going to use anyway.


Hauke
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