key generation: paranoia mode - explicit random input

[Hauke Laging]

Am Do 27.02.2014, 22:30:01 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
> > Trivial to prevent in comparison to the task of verifying a distro.
> 
> There are literally thousands of vectors.  Defending against *all* of
> them is a deeply nontrivial task.

As usual I can agree only.

But what does that mean in practice? Does that mean we don't aim for 
improvements any more, not even those which are easy to implement?

Why are we talking about something like SHA-3 at all if "all is lost to 
THEM" anyway? (Please note that I am not implying this was your 
attitude.)

Besides the obvious development resource limit I guess the point should 
be: How much more security would one get from a certain action and how 
much effort would it be?


Hauke
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