Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

[Doug Barton]

On 01/19/2014 08:56 AM, Mr. Clif wrote:
> So I'm trying to get a sense from the users here if they feel that the
> process of using gpg for symmetric encryption is safe enough, and they
> are not worried about leaving clear text behind.

I think you're misunderstanding a few things. First, the problem of the 
plain text file is not exclusive to symmetric encryption. In fact there 
is no difference between that, and the plain text file that's left 
behind after public key encryption.

Second, you haven't defined your threat model. You have given us a vague 
sense of wanting to have a "secure" system, but you haven't said what 
you're trying to secure it against. Thus it's hard to respond 
intelligently to your query.

That said, I would suggest that you consider using a RAM disk to do your 
work on. It can be created to do the work, then deleted after you're 
done, with no risk of leaving a file behind on disk. Of course you'd 
want to make sure your RAM disk was not swap-backed.

hope this helps,

Doug