GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography

The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm whirlpool at
Mon Jul 7 15:35:08 CEST 2014

Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 15:26:36 +0200
From: The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm <whirlpool at>
To: Peter Lebbing <peter at>;, gnupg-users at
Subject: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography
Message-ID: <20140707132636.GA64824 at>
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On Mon, Jul 07, 2014 at 11:50:30AM +0200, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> Could you explain what you mean? I'm really getting the impression we're
> talking about cracking an encryption key, and I don't see how revoking
> such a key would help significantly for that.
> Peter.
I mean, to prevent private key compromise, it's a good practice to set
an expiration date to your keys. So that, when the keys expire, you can
generate better keys to prevent a probability that the old keys have
been compromised.
I don't say that this is the safest thing to do to prevent old data
being decrypted.
I'm pretty sure, when the quantum systems are publicly available, GPG
will be updated with new algorithm to ensure key safety against such
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