Defaults

[Robert J. Hansen]

> by this argument, you should have pushed for RSA 3072 during the
> last defaults change, since it would have lasted longer than 2048 ;)

You're absolutely right, I should have.  :)  I took my eye off the ball
and didn't notice we were changing defaults, otherwise I would've argued
then for RSA-3072.

> At any rate, changes are afoot, and i don't think we should be afraid
> to update the defaults if we think a new set is reasonable.

Point, point.  The ECC ecosystem isn't mature enough to encourage users
to migrate to it.

Okay, so drop the ECC recommendations from my suggestions.
RSA-3072/SHA-256 + one of the modern 128-bit block ciphers, plus strong
recommendations against CAST5, IDEA, or using 64-bit block ciphers to do
bulk encryption.  So far that all seems pretty uncontroversial.  :)



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