"general purpose OS is fundamentally inadequate for trusted operations"

[Robert J. Hansen]

> No, that is *one of* the game-over conditions; it is not *the* game-over
> condition.

[a lot of stuff I agree with snipped]

Please re-read the thread.  You'll see you're agreeing with Peter
Lebbing and me.  We've consistently maintained smart cards are useful in
a number of use cases and threat models -- but they do not rise to the
level listo is ascribing to them.

> There are a
> few possible attacks that the use of a smartcard mitigates, and
> therefore a smartcard key *is* more secure than a non-smartcard key

No.  It's more secure *only if those attacks are within your threat
profile*.

Wearing a parachute gives me additional security against, say, aircraft
disasters.  But if I don't fly anywhere, it's just an inconvenience
which offers me no additional security.