DRM?

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

On 01/16/2018 05:26 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> A mechanism where you can have a signed statement saying
> "on 2018-01-16, I allow my key to show up on keyservers", and a signed
> statement saying "from 2018-04-01 on you should no longer expose this
> key to clients"

I'm somewhat interested in hearing how this scheme would work in the
case of a compromised private key. Mainly;

(i) How would you distribute revocation certificates
(ii) Would you trust a signature for removal of keyblock provided to the
keyserver (a) after a revocation certificate has been added (b) before a
revocation has been added (as measured on the specific keyserver).
(iii) iff (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) differ; how would you handle a sync
conflict of said data?

-- 
----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
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Public OpenPGP keyblock at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
----------------------------
"If you don't drive your business, you will be driven out of business"
(B. C. Forbes)

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