SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack

[Peter Lebbing]

> "Look, this one guy who just got mugged? [...]

I had to read it twice to distill what I think Mirimir meant, but I
think they meant that if you blacklist/blackhole all affected
certificates, you remove the incentive for the attackers to poison more
certificates since the poison can't spread to the people fetching keys.
Thus stopping the attackers.

I concluded that Mirimir perhaps forgot about that this creates a second
attack model, where you can block keys from being on the keyserver. This
seems like a new problem that means this stopgap measure is probably not
the one we want, since it still provides the incentive for attackers to
poison keys.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 488 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20190630/eaeaf6cd/attachment-0001.sig>