SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack

[Konstantin Ryabitsev]

On Sun, Jun 30, 2019 at 03:49:55AM -0700, Mirimir via Gnupg-users wrote:
>> c) what happens when they go after more certificates?
>>
>> If you're willing to blackhole two certs, great.  Where does it stop?
>> How many certs can the strong set stand to lose?
>
>Your third point is actually why I suggested this. Maybe I'm just
>twisted, but what if some dickhead goes after certs that would break
>stuff for millions of people? One might, for example, block Linux kernel
>maintenance and development. Maybe just before using some 0-day.

I highly doubt this would be effective, mainly because I don't think 
anyone on the kernel development side of things runs keyring refreshes 
in any routine fashion -- if ever. For those relying on PGP to verify 
downloaded releases, we provide WKD lookups 
(https://www.kernel.org/signature.html).

This whole thing *will* probably push me towards setting up a Hagrid 
instance, especially if we can teach it to compare submissions against 
an allow-list. Not sure what I'm going to do about the whole "web of 
trust" side of things, though. I *really* don't like the idea of setting 
up any kind of certification/trust authority.

-K