Managing the WoT with GPG

[martin f krafft]

also sprach Neal H. Walfield <neal at walfield.org> [2017-06-22 16:15 +0200]:
> I didn't say that it is not possible to have a better algorithm.  It
> is possible.  But, it is not as easy as you suggest (and what you
> suggest doesn't sound trivial).
> 
> For instance, adding or updating a key doesn't necessarily result in
> equal or more trust.  An update could cause a key to be revoked.  In
> that case, if 0xdeadbeef is marginally trusted, we now need to
> identify keys that were considered valid because of 0xdeadbeef, but no
> longer are.

This would be handled upon use of such keys. In fact, rather than
updating the trustdb on update of key material, wouldn't it make
much more sense to compute the information just-in-time? Provided
we'd have a data format allowing for fast access like this?

-- 
@martinkrafft | http://madduck.net/ | http://two.sentenc.es/
 
"the scientific paper in its orthodox form does embody a totally
 mistaken conception, even a travesty, of the nature of scientific
 thought."
                                                -- sir peter medawar
 
spamtraps: madduck.bogus at madduck.net
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: digital_signature_gpg.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 1118 bytes
Desc: Digital GPG signature (see http://martin-krafft.net/gpg/sig-policy/999bbcc4/current)
URL: </pipermail/attachments/20170622/20b73a5c/attachment-0001.sig>